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Michael Adams Sr. was born in Sacramento, California on May 5, 1930
to Michael and Georgia Adams, the oldest of two brothers. Michael
graduated from high school in 1948, going on to Sacramento Junior
College, graduating in 1950 with an AA in Forestry. Adams served as
a fighter-bomber pilot during the Korean conflict, followed by 30
months with the 813th Fighter-Bomber Squadron at England AFB,
Louisiana and six months rotational duty at Chaumont Air Base in
France.
Michael entered the U.S. Air Force on November 22, 1950, undergoing
Basic training at Lackland Air Force Base. After Basic, he served
with with the 3501st Pilot Training as a Link Trainer instructor
until he was selected as an Aviation Cadet. He underwent primary
training at Spence, Georgia, October 1951. From Spence he went to
Webb AFB, Texas, for Advanced training where he earned his wings on
October 25, 1952 at Webb AFB, Texas.
After Advanced, it was on to Nellis AFB, Nevada for gunnery school,
where he flew F-80s and F-86s. Upon completion, 1LT Adams was
shipped off to Korea in April of 1953. As 1st Lieutenant, Flight
Commander 618th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, Korea, he flew a total of
49 combat missions.
Returning from Korea in February 1954, Lieutenant Adams served
another three years as a flight commander in fighter squadrons in
the U.S. and France. It was during his tour at the 813th
Fighter-Bomber Squadron, England AFB, Lousiana that Michael and
Frieda Beard were married.
In the fall of 1956, Michael entered the University of Oklahoma, as
part of an Air Force career development program for promising
officers. He earned his Aeronautical Engineering degree in 1958. He
went on to do his graduate work in Astronautics at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. Completing these studies, Michael went to
work at Chanute AFB, Illinois as an instructor. During this time he
was selected as a student at the USAF Test Pilot School at Edwards
AFB.
Adams graduated from Test Pilot School in 1962 as the outstanding
pilot and scholar in his class. For this he was awarded the Honts
Trophy. He was then selected to attend Chuck Yeager's Aerospace
Research Pilot School, from which he graduated in 1963.
Major Michael Adams' decorations and awards:
Air Medal
Air Force Commendation Medal
Korean Service Medal
United Nations Service Medal
National Defense Service Medal with 1 Bronze Service Star
Air Force Longevity Service Award with 4 Clusters
Air Force Good Conduct Medal
Honts Trophy |
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As had happened in some other
research aircraft programs, a fatal accident signaled the end of the
X-15 program. On 15 November 1967 at 10:30 a.m., the X-15-3 dropped
away from its B-52 mothership at 45,000 feet near Delamar Dry Lake.
At the controls was veteran Air Force test pilot, Major Michael J.
Adams. Starting his climb under full power, he was soon passing
through 85,000 feet. Then an electrical disturbance distracted him
and slightly degraded the control of the aircraft. Having adequate
backup controls, Adams continued on. At 10:33 he reached a peak
altitude of 266,000 feet. In the DFRC flight control room, fellow
pilot and mission controller Pete Knight monitored the mission with
a team of engineers. Something was amiss. As the X-15 climbed, Adams
started a planned wing-rocking maneuver so an on-board camera could
scan the horizon. The wing rocking quickly became excessive, by a
factor of two or three. When he concluded the wing-rocking portion
of the climb, the X-15 began a slow, gradual drift in heading; 40
seconds later, when the craft reached its maximum altitude, it was
off heading by 15°. As the plane came over the top, the drift
briefly halted, with the plane yawed 15° to the right. Then the
drift began again; within 30 seconds, the plane was descending at
right angles to the flight path. At 230,000 feet, encountering
rapidly increasing dynamic pressures, the X-15 entered a Mach 5 spin.
In the flight control room there was no way to monitor heading, so
nobody suspected the true situation that Adams now faced. The
controllers did not know that the plane was yawing, eventually
turning completely around. In fact, control advised the pilot that
he was ”a little bit high,” but in ”real good shape.” Just 15
seconds later, Adams radioed that the plane ”seems squirrelly.” At
10:34 came a shattering call: ”I'm in a spin, Pete.” A mission
monitor called out that Adams had, indeed, lost control of the plane.
A NASA test pilot said quietly, ”That boy's in trouble.” Plagued by
lack of heading information, the control room staff saw only large
and very slow pitching and rolling motions. One reaction was
”disbelief; the feeling that possibly he was overstating the case.”
But Adams again called out, ”I'm in a spin.” As best they could, the
ground controllers sought to get the X-15 straightened out. They
knew they had only seconds left. There was no recommended spin
recovery technique for the plane, and engineers knew nothing about
the X-15's supersonic spin tendencies. The chase pilots, realizing
that the X-15 would never make Rogers Lake, went into afterburner
and raced for the emergency lakes, for Ballarat, for Cuddeback.
Adams held the X-15's controls against the spin, using both the
aerodynamic control surfaces and the reaction controls. Through some
combination of pilot technique and basic aerodynamic stability, the
plane recovered from the spin at 118,000 feet and went into a Mach
4.7 dive, inverted, at a dive angle between 40 and 45 degrees.
Adams was in a relatively high altitude dive and had a good chance
of rolling upright, pulling out, and setting up a landing. But now
came a technical problem that spelled the end. The Honeywell
adaptive flight control system began a limit-cycle oscillation just
as the plane came out of the spin, preventing the system's gain
changer from reducing pitch as dynamic pressure increased. The X-15
began a rapid pitching motion of increasing severity. All the while,
the plane shot downward at 160,000 feet per minute, dynamic pressure
increasing intolerably. High over the desert, it passed abeam of
Cuddeback Lake, over the Searles Valley, over the Pinnacles,
narrowing on toward Johannesburg. As the X-15 neared 65,000 feet, it
was speeding downward at Mach 3.93 and experiencing over 15 g
vertically, both positive and negative, and 8 g laterally. It broke
up into many pieces amid loud sonic rumblings, striking northeast of
Johannesburg. Two hunters heard the noise and saw the forward
fuselage, the largest section, tumbling over a hill. On the ground,
NASA control lost all telemetry at the moment of breakup, but still
called to Adams. A chase pilot spotted dust on Cuddeback, but it was
not the X-15. Then an Air Force pilot, who had been up on a delayed
chase mission and had tagged along on the X-15 flight to see if he
could fill in for an errant chase plane, spotted the main wreckage
northwest of Cuddeback. Mike Adams was dead, the X-15 destroyed.
NASA and the Air Force convened an accident board.
Chaired by NASA's Donald R. Bellman, the board took two months to
prepare and write its report. Ground parties scoured the countryside
looking for wreckage, any bits that might furnish clues. Critical to
the investigation was the cockpit camera and its film. The weekend
after the accident, a voluntary and unofficial DFRC search party
found the camera; disappointingly, the film cartridge was nowhere in
sight. Engineers theorized that the film cassette, being lighter
than the camera, might be further away, to the north, blown there by
winds at altitude. DFRC engineer Victor Horton organized a search
and on 29 November, during the first pass over the area, W. E. Dives
found the cassette, in good condition. Investigators meanwhile
concentrated on analyzing all telemetered data, interviewing
participants and witnesses, and studying the aircraft systems. Most
puzzling was Adams' complete lack of awareness of major heading
deviations in spite of accurately functioning cockpit
instrumentation. The accident board concluded that he had allowed
the aircraft to deviate as the result of a combination of
distraction, misinterpreting his instrumentation display – and
possible vertigo. The electrical disturbance early in the flight
degraded the overall effectiveness of the aircraft's control system
and further added to pilot workload. The X-15's adaptive control
system then broke up the airplane on reentry. The board made two
major recommendations: install a telemetered heading indicator in
the control room, visible to the flight controller, and medically
screen X-15 pilot candidates for labyrinth (vertigo) sensitivity. As
a result of the X-15's crash, DFRC added a ground-based ”8 ball”
attitude indicator, displayed on a TV monitor in the control room,
which furnished mission controllers with ”"real time” pitch, roll,
heading, angle of attack, and sideslip information available to the
pilot, using this for the remainder of the X-15 program...
Very little remains at this site. In fact, aside from a small
American flag posted in the center of the site, the average person
would been totally unaware of the historic nature of their
surroundings. Small, scattered pieces are sprinkled there, and
finding anything of the aircraft at the site is nearly impossible (however,
portions of the X-15A-3 such as an engine access panel, a reaction
control rocket for maneuvering in the upper atmosphere, a piece of
the horizontal stabilizer, and a section of vertical stabilizer that
had the numerals '72' on it, were found as late as 1992). Rumor has
it that the left wing has never been found.
Credit:Check-Six.com |
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